Town prevails on wrongful termination suit appeal

An appellate court judge has reversed a Superior Court decision that found the town violated the so-called “strong chief” statute when the Board of Selectmen declined to renew then Fire Chief Mark Tetreault’s contract in 2018.

The statute – Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 48, Section 42 –  provides that fire chiefs may be “removed for cause” at any time after a hearing. Tetreault maintained the board did not establish cause or afford him a hearing.

Appeals Court Judge Marguerite Grant found instead that the statute did not apply as Tetreault was not “removed;” his contract was simply not renewed.

“We are pleased with the decision, but we have no further comment at this time,” said Town Counsel Thomas Mullen

The board appointed Tetreault as fire chief in December 2013 subject to successful negotiation of a contract. During negotiations, he told the town administrator that “it was his understanding that under the strong chief statute, a chief could ‘only could be terminated for cause.’” The parties executed a contract on Jan. 16, 2014. Paragraph 12.B provided that Tetreault “may be disciplined or discharged only for just cause upon proper notice and only after a hearing.”

In June 2018, the board voted not to renew his contract at the end of its term on Dec. 31 of that year. The board informed Tetreault of its intent in a June 26 letter. Grant’s decision stated that the board’s letter gave no reason for its decision and further that the board refused to provide Tetreault with a hearing.

Tetreault filed a wrongful termination action in Superior Court in August 2018, seeking declaratory relief for wrongful termination.

Tetreault maintained that when he signed an employment contract as fire chief, he believed it carried a lifetime appointment under the strong chief statute.

Both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Judge C. William Barrett found in favor of Tetreault. 

“He ordered and declared that the town’s board of selectmen violated the strong chief statute, the town charter and the personnel bylaws of the town’s municipal code by removing Tetreault without a hearing and the establishment of cause (as required under the strong chief statute),” Grant wrote in the appellate court decision. “Because what happened was a nonrenewal of Tetreault’s contract as permitted by its terms and not a removal from office within the meaning of the strong chief statute, we reverse.”

The court reviewed the strong chief statute and its counterpart, the so-called “weak chief” statute (G.L. c.48, §42A) and found that under the strong chief statute, “strong chiefs have ‘full and absolute authority,’” and that the chief can be removed for cause by the board only after a hearing.

In contrast, “the weak chief serves at the pleasure’ of the selectmen,” who do not need to show cause before removing the chief.

The appellate court focused on the language of the strong chief statute, particularly the meaning of the word “removed.”

“Under the language of the strong chief statute… Tetreault was entitled to a hearing and a demonstration of cause if he was ‘removed’ from the position of fire chief,” Grant wrote.

Grant then cited the dictionary, saying, “in the employment context, that word ordinarily connotes a forced dismissal or termination” and also cited case law, finding that “‘failure’ to reappoint an officer upon the expiration of a definite term, and the selection of another to fill the office does not constitute a removal from office. Here, Tetreault was not removed from his position while the contract was in effect.”

Grant noted that courts interpreting other sections of the General Laws distinguished contract non renewals from removals and dismissals.

“Tetreault’s employment came to a natural end under the terms of the mutually agreed-upon contract after the board voted not to renew his contract. We conclude that the board did not remove Tetreault within the meaning of the statute, and therefore no statutory violation occurred,” Grant wrote.

The case has been remanded back to Superior Court, where Grant’s new judgment shall enter.

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